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On February 28–March 1, 2003, the University of San Diego Institute 
for Law and Philosophy held a conference entitled “Baselines and 
Counterfactuals in the Theory of Compensatory Damages: What Do 
Compensatory Damages Compensate?”  The articles in this collection 
emerge from that symposium. 
First, Robert Cooter, Herman Selvin Professor of Law at the 
University of California at Berkeley, discusses in his article, Hand Rule 
Damages for Incompensable Losses, how money cannot compensate for 
some losses, as when parents suffer the death of a child.  For incompensable 
losses, courts should develop a theory and practice of damages from the 
way reasonable people respond to the risk of incompensable losses.  
Specifically, Cooter argues, courts should apply the Hand rule to find 
damages based on the reasonable person’s point of indifference between 
less risk and more expenditure on precaution.  Cooter asserts that Hand 
rule damages are efficient and fair.  Implementing Hand rule damages 
would cause a significant increase in damage awards and insurance costs 
for some important kinds of accidents. 
In Can We Compensate for Incompensable Harms, Dr. Adi Ayal, 
member of the Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, further develops 
some aspects of Cooter’s arguments and critiques others.  He focuses on 
methodological issues, including the application of behavioral economics 
to risk assessment and the difference between lexical preferences and 
incomplete ordering.  The issues addressed in the legal literature of 
compensatory damages, he argues, are explained better by lexical 
preferences, a point stressed when he applies the same to Cooter’s 
scheme of compensation for risk rather than harm.  Dr. Ayal then questions 
Cooter’s assumption that risk is always compensable, even when the 
actual harm is not. 
Richard Craswell, William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of 
Law at Stanford University, surveys various economic or instrumental 
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theories of remedies, arguing that the concept of “compensation” plays a 
very different role in these theories than it does in theories of corrective 
justice. This difference was less apparent during the 1970s, when the 
earliest economic theories often suggested that compensatory remedies 
would be efficient.  But more recent economic theories have identified a 
number of reasons why efficient remedies might be either greater or less 
than compensatory damages. 
More fundamentally, Craswell argues that corrective justice theories 
often begin by taking it as a premise or axiom that remedies should be 
compensatory.  By contrast, he says, economic theories are concerned 
only with the instrumental effects of remedies, without regard to whether 
a given remedy qualifies as compensatory.  As a result, Craswell asserts 
that economic theories have more to say about many practical or second-
order questions, such as the exact quantum of damages that ought to be 
awarded in any given case.  Those questions cannot plausibly be 
addressed by appealing to some abstract definition of “compensation,” 
but they may be addressable (in principle, at least) by an instrumental 
analysis of a remedy’s effects. 
Michael Moore, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois, examines 
in his article, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual 
Baselines, the question of whether we are liable to compensate for harm 
that we cause only when our acts “make a difference” in the world, 
meaning the kind of negative difference we think of as harmful to others.  
In doing so, this article examines a number of legal contexts in which the 
“make a difference” principle seems critical in either sustaining or 
denying liability.  Because the “make a difference” principle is explicitly 
counterfactual in nature, and because the dominant theory of factual 
causation in the law equates causation with counterfactual dependence, 
this article focuses on the counterfactual theory.  In the end, Moore 
concludes that it is generally causation that is dominant in determining 
legal liability, not counterfactual dependence. 
In Moore, Causation, Counterfactuals, and Responsibility, Richard 
Fumerton, Professor at the University of Iowa, responds to Michael 
Moore’s article.  According to Fumerton, the employment of counterfactual 
tests seems to pervade the law, not only in determining at whose feet to 
lay a harm but also, perhaps more importantly, in determining whether 
or not someone was harmed in the first place.  For that reason, he agrees 
completely with Moore that one cannot very well ignore counterfactuals 
despite the fact that they resist (for the reasons Moore gives) easy 
analysis.  While he also agrees with Moore that one cannot analyze 
causation employing counterfactuals, he does not agree that causation 
gives us “cleaner” breaks that are more useful in assigning responsibility 
than do counterfactuals.  He argues that one should view facts as the 
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relata of causal connection, and that if one does, one faces similar 
problems employing both causal and counterfactuals tests in deciding 
which among the indefinitely many lawfully relevant antecedent conditions 
are relevant to the assignment of responsibility in criminal and civil law.  
On either kind of test, one must inevitably rely heavily on pragmatic 
considerations to make legally relevant distinctions.  Fumerton concludes 
by arguing that in an ideal world one would employ neither causal nor 
counterfactual tests in assigning criminal and civil responsibility.  One 
would focus instead on internal properties of actors.  This is not, 
however, an ideal world, and pragmatic considerations probably argue 
against revising our current legal practice. 
In his article Harm, History and Counterfactuals, Stephen Perry, 
Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at 
New York University School of Law, examines certain aspects of the 
concept of harm.  He argues that harm must be understood as a setback 
to an interest, and that the determination of whether or not an interest has 
been set back requires a comparison between two states of affairs.  He 
defends this view against a general critique of “comparative” models of 
harm that has been advanced by Seana Shiffrin.  Perry further argues that 
the relevant baseline of comparison for determining whether or not there 
has been harm is the status quo ante, meaning the state of affairs that 
existed prior to the causal process that led to the allegedly harmful 
condition.  He defends this “historical worsening” account of harm 
against the “counterfactual” account of Joel Feinberg, which claims that 
the appropriate baseline of comparison is the state of affairs that would 
have obtained had the relevant causal process not occurred.  Although all 
harms are, according to Perry, setbacks to interests, he argues that not all 
setbacks to interests are properly regarded as harms.  In defending this 
conclusion he distinguishes between “core” or “primary” interests, 
which represent fundamental aspects of human well-being, and 
“secondary” interests, which are interests defined in terms of core 
interests.  Thus a person has a core interest in not being physically 
injured, and a secondary interest in not being subject to the risk of 
physical injury.  A setback to the former interest is harm, but according 
to Perry, a setback to the latter interest is not.  Finally, Perry discusses 
the issue of compensation for harm in tort law.  He argues that although 
harm itself should be understood in terms of an historical worsening, 
there is much to be said for the view that compensation for harm should 
be determined not historically but counterfactually.  There is much to be 
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said, in other words, for the view that the quantum of damages should be 
determined not by attempting to restore the plaintiff to the status quo 
ante, but rather by trying to put him in the position that he would have 
been in had the tort not occurred. 
In Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, Professor John C.P. 
Goldberg of Vanderbilt Law School offers a constructive commentary 
on Perry’s article, Harm, Counterfactuals, and Compensation.  In the 
first part of his commentary, Goldberg offers to refine Perry’s account 
by suggesting that there is an important distinction to be drawn between 
“harm” and “injury.”  Using illustrations drawn from tort and contract 
law, Goldberg argues that harm, as Perry defines it, should be 
understood as a special instance of injury, to be contrasted with other 
forms of injury, including rights violations and lost expectancies.   
In its second part, Goldberg’s article plays off of Perry’s analysis to 
provide a novel interpretation of the proximate cause component of 
negligence law.  Rejecting standard views that proximate cause serves 
only to prevent “excessive” litigation or liability, Goldberg argues that 
the doctrine instantiates a general principle of tort law, namely, that a 
victim can only recover on a tort claim if she herself has been wronged  
by the alleged tortfeasor.  Thus, on Goldberg’s reconstruction, by 
preventing the attribution of responsibility for fortuitously-caused harms, 
proximate cause limits liability to instances in which there is not merely 
wrongful conduct by D that causes injury to P, but in addition a 
wronging of P by D.  This understanding of proximate cause, he maintains, 
fits well within a “civil recourse” theory of tort law, and helps explain 
away various doctrinal puzzles, such as the thin-skull rule, and the 
greater willingness of intentional tort doctrine to impose liability 
notwithstanding fortuitous causation. 
In What to Compensate? Some Surprisingly Unappreciated Reasons 
Why the Problem Is So Hard, Leo Katz, Professor of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania, argues that finding the rightful measure of 
compensation involves first finding the right baseline. But baseline 
problems, though common throughout law, are remarkably ill-understood. 
Rather than solve these problems outright, Katz seeks to get to the 
bottom of their multiple roots. The four kinds of cases being considered 
are typified by (1) the plaintiff whose leg the defendant tortiously 
broke—thus preventing him from getting on the plane that crashed (i.e., 
the "failure to worsen" cases); (2) the plaintiff whose loss of legs due to 
the defendant's tortious conduct caused her to give up her career as a 
professional athlete—with the result that she is now much happier and 
has no regrets about losing her former career (i.e., the "subjective 
improvement" cases); (3) the promisee of an enforceable contractual 
promise asking to be put in the position he would have been in had the 
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promise been kept rather than had the promise never been made (i.e, the 
contract damage question); (4) the plaintiff who but for defendant's 
tortious conduct would not exist, with particular emphasis on the 
descendants of slaves who but for slavery would not have existed, and 
surely not in the United States. 
In Baselines and Compensation, a response to Leo Katz, F.M. Kamm, 
Professor at New York University, argues that Katz’s approach to the 
failure-to-worsen cases illustrates the conflict between “objective” and 
“state-of-mind” theories of liability.  While noting that the objective 
theory underlies any defense of a counterfactual baseline for damages, 
Professor Kamm advances a “cause dependence principle,” which 
evaluates a defendant’s state of mind as a causal factor when determining 
liability.  In response to Katz’s discussion of the raw utility problem, 
Kamm argues that differing legal obligations in the “interpersonal” and 
“intrapersonal” contexts prevents the type of cycling of legal obligations 
discussed by Katz. 
In discussing Katz’s analysis of contract expectancy damages, Kamm 
argues that problems arise due to the fact that contractual obligations 
create rights in future performance as opposed to property rights in the 
product of future performance.  Finally, in discussing Katz’s view of the 
“future generations conundrum,” she presents her own view that creators 
owe their creations a certain set of conditions, the “minima,” which may 
be used to determine liability to future generations. 
Emily Sherwin, Professor of Law at the Cornell Law School, argues in 
her article, Compensation and Revenge, that damages described as 
compensatory in fact provide not only compensation but also an element of 
retaliation for legal wrongs.  She then examines the moral status of civil 
remedies as an vehicle for revenge. 
Kenneth W. Simons, M.L. Sykes Scholar and Professor of Law at Boston 
University School of Law, responds to Emily Sherwin’s conception of 
tort damages as containing a component of judicially-sanctioned revenge.  
In Compensation: Justice or Revenge?, Simons both challenges Sherwin’s 
retributivist model and uses some of its propositions to explore his 
preferred, nonconsequentialist account of tort doctrine. 
According to Simons, a significant impetus for Sherwin’s revenge-based 
theory is what she perceives as the failure of the nonconsequentialist 
account to explain the way actual compensation practice works.  Simons 
counters by arguing that the nonconsequentialist model, in fact, has more 
positive strength than Sherwin allows.  For instance, contrary to Sherwin’s 
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restatement of the doctrine, the corrective justice model of tort liability 
does require linkage between the victim’s right and the injurer’s duty.  This 
linkage can explain why tort law entitles victims to compensation not just 
from some source or other, but specifically from the wrongful injurer who 
caused their losses.  It can also explain why a vengeance rationale is not 
needed in order to make sense of compensation practice. 
After rejecting Sherwin’s revenge theory as the global justification of 
tort compensation, Simons next considers whether and how the 
retributive impulse informs some discrete areas of the law.  In the areas 
of pain and suffering, and punitive and hedonic damages, Simons 
assesses Sherwin’s arguments and, in some cases, finds them compelling 
if incomplete.  Finally, Simons follows Sherwin into the phenomenology 
of tort litigation and concludes that, while the relevance of revenge to 
some aspects of the litigation mechanism is unclear, there is good reason 
to believe that the revenge “story” played out in lawsuits is a significant 
part of how the legal system understands itself. 
In The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, Richard Wright, 
Professor of Law at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute 
of Technology, puts forth the following argument.  The usual academic 
solution to the so-called “proximate cause” (extent of legal responsibility) 
issue is a single, harm-matches-the-foreseeable-risk (harm-risked) limitation. 
This limitation, which has been championed by successive editions of 
the Restatement, supposedly implements the morally attractive proposition 
that the reasons for creating liability should limit the extent of that 
liability. 
According to Wright, the harm-risked limitation, however, is based on 
a misunderstanding of the grounds of legal responsibility.  It thus must 
be qualified by numerous exceptions to be even minimally plausible, and 
even then it is seriously underinclusive and overinclusive.  Moreover, it 
has not been accepted by the courts.  Instead, courts apply a number of 
limitations that are explained and justified by a proper understanding of 
the grounds of legal responsibility.  The three principal limitations 
prevent liability for a tortiously caused harm when (1) the harm almost 
certainly would have occurred anyway in the absence of any tortious 
conduct or condition, (2) there was a superseding cause of the harm (an 
intervening, highly unexpected, but-for cause of  the harm), or (3) the 
harm did not occur as part of the realization and playing out of one of 
the foreseeable risks that made the person’s conduct tortious, before the 
hazards created by the realization of that risk had dissipated. 
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